"The most familiar and probably the most widely accepted moral objection to the policy of nuclear deterrence is that it involves a conditional intention to use nuclear weapons in ways that would be immoral. Because it requires this intention, which is itself held to be wrongful, nuclear deterrence is deemed to be immoral, even if it is successful and nuclear weapons are never used. This "Deontologist's Argument" is one which makes many of those who are skeptical about the morality of nuclear deterrence uncomfortable. For, obviously, one can (as I do) believe both that there are strong moral arguments against nuclear deterrence and that this particular argument is not among them. Yet in rejecting the argument one not only risks giving the impression that it is fine to intend to commit mass murder but also risks losing important allies in the antinuclear movement (particularly in theological circles) whose faith in this particular argument is the sole basis of their opposition to nuclear deterrence. In spite of these risks, my aim here will be to expose the source of the not uncommon dissatisfaction with the Deontologist's argument. My hope is that those who have been persuaded by this argument will discover that it does not in fact articulate the intuitive basis of their opposition to nuclear deterrence, so that their opposition to nuclear deterrence will survive even if their acceptance of this particular argument does not."...